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Abstract
This paper presents a theoretical and empirical analysis of policies
aimed at setting a more depreciated level of the real exchange rate. An
intertemporal optimizing model suggests that, in the absence of changes in
fiscal policy, a more depreciated level of the real exchange can only be
attained temporarily. This can be achieved by means of higher inflation
and/or higher real interest rates, depending on the degree of capital
mobility. Evidence for Brazil, Chile, and Colombia supports the model's
prediction that undervalued real exchange rates are associated with higher
inflation.
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I. Introduction
In an open economy, either the money supply or the nominal exchange
rate can serve as a nominal anchor. Such an anchor is usually viewed as a
necessary condition for macroeconomic stability since, at least in the long
run, all nominal variables will converge to the pre-set rate of growth of
either the money supply or the exchange rate. Assuming that appropriate
fiscal and microeconomic policies are in place, the price stability brought
about by a nominal anchor should ensure that the economy achieves long-run
economic growth.
In practice, however, such a "neo-classical" view of policymaking is
not universally accepted. Policymakers are not always content, especially
in the short-run, with targeting nominal variables such as the exchange rate
or the money supply. After all, the reasoning goes, if one is really
interested in the behavior of real variables which have a direct bearing on
growth (such as the real exchange rate or real interest rates), why not
bypass nominal targets and simply try to set those variables at their
desired levels? Thus, in spite of dire warnings from neo-classically
inclined economists about the perils of losing the nominal anchor,
policymakers have time and time again pursued real targets in implementing
monetary and exchange rate policy.
Since the real exchange rate is a key relative price in any open
economy, it is probably the most popular real target
 t at least in developing
countries. 1/ By definition, then, a policy of "real exchange rate
targeting" aims at controlling the level of the real exchange rate, either
in an effort to keep it at a constant level in the face of domestic or
external shocks, or achieve a different (usually more depreciated) level.
Diverse circumstances lead policymakers to engage in real exchange rate
targeting. One of the most common reasons is the desire to index the
nominal rate to the price level in an effort to avoid losses in
competitiveness. Such policies are usually referred to as "purchasing power
parity (PPP) rules." An early example is Brazil, where such a policy was
adopted in August 1968 (Bacha (1979)). 2/ According to this rule, the
exchange rate was changed by small percentages at irregular intervals of
time (ten to fifty days), depending on the inflation differential between
Brazil and the United States. With occasional deviations (due, for example,
to changes in terms of trade and short-lived stabilization programs), Brazil
has been following PPP rules ever since, even if such rules have not always
been made explicit. This is illustrated (beginning in 1978) in Figure 1,
1/ It is certainly not the only one. Chile, for instance, has also used
an interest rate on an indexed bond (i.e., a real interest rate) as its main
policy instrument since 1985 (see Fontaine (1991)).
2/ According to Williamson (1981), Chile was the first country to adopt a
PPP rule in 1965 (see French-Davis (1981)).
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which plots the behavior of the actual nominal exchange rate alongside the
nominal exchange rate that would be consistent with a PPP rule. JL/
Chile arguably provides the most consummate example of a PPP rule. In
July 1986, an exchange rate band was established whose central parity is
adjusted at daily intervals according to a schedule based on the inflation
rate during the previous month minus the estimated world inflation rate.
Remarkably enough, there were no deviations from this rule until
January 1992, when renewed pressures towards nominal appreciation of the
peso stemming from capital inflows led to a revaluation of 5 percent. The
Chilean PPP rule can be clearly seen in Figure 1, starting in mid-1985.
Following a sharp real devaluation during 1985, Colombia also followed a PPP
rule during the period 1986-1990, as can be seen in Figure 1. 2/
A second example of real exchange rate targeting consists of policies
designed to achieve a more depreciated level of the real exchange rate.
Chile, for instance, pursued a very aggressive policy of nominal devaluation
during the period June 1982-June 1985, making a point of devaluing the
domestic currency by rates that far exceeded the rate of inflation in order
to engineer a substantial real depreciation (Edwards (1991)). As a result,
in July 1985, the real exchange rate had almost doubled with respect to its
May 1982 level (see Figure 2). 3/ Similarly, during 1985 Colombia
devalued the domestic currency by substantial amounts, which led to a real
depreciation of about 50 percent (Figure 2).
For all its practical and policy relevance, there is relatively little
analytical work, and even less econometric work, on real exchange rate
targeting. Adams and Gros (1986) were among the first to formally ask the
two questions which, in our view, are key in analyzing real exchange rate
1/ The PPP exchange rate was computed as the ratio of the domestic CPI to
that of the United States, and based by giving it the same value as the
actual exchange in 78.01 for Brazil, 85.07 for Chile, and 86.01 for
Colombia. (The United States inflation is used for simplicity; more
comprehensive indices could be used.) In the case of Brazil, the base date
coincides with the beginning of the sample; in the case of Chile and
Colombia, the base date marks the beginning of a period during which a PPP
rule was in effect (see below).
2/ In work in progress, we have analyzed these episodes in detail, and
provided econometric evidence on the existence of PPP rules. Specifically,
using monthly data we test for Granger-causality between inflation and the
nominal exchange rate. As expected, we find that during the periods in
which a PPP rule was in effect in both Chile and Colombia, the rate of
devaluation was Granger-caused by inflation. In Brazil, considering the
whole sample with the exception of the Cruzado and Collor plans, inflation
also Granger-causes the rate of devaluation.
3/ Note that in Figure 2, a rise in the real exchange rate index
indicates real depreciation.
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Figure 1. Nominal and PPP Exchange Rates
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Figure 2. Real Effective Exchange Rates and Inflation
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targeting. 1/ First, what are the inflationary consequences of giving up
a nominal anchor? Second, can money provide the needed nominal anchor if
capital is less than perfectly mobile? In the context of a log-linear
stochastic model, Adams and Gros (1986) argue that, in the presence of PPP
rules, inflation tends to be whatever it was in the past, modified by shocks
to prices during the current period (i.e., inflation follows a random-walk).
The intuition is simply that the exchange rate fully accommodates all price
shocks and, hence, has no long-run equilibrium value. Furthermore, they
show that a sustained policy of sterilizing monetary inflows (which is
possible under no capital mobility) is unfeasible, as it leads to either
unstable current account or foreign assets.
More recently, Lizondo (1991, 1993) and Montiel and Ostry (1991, 1992)
have reexamined the same two issues (among others) in terms of a common
reduced-form, deterministic model. 2J As shown in Lizondo (1991), real
exchange rate targeting is also inflationary in this framework, but the
mechanism is fundamentally different from that highlighted in Adams and
Gros (1986). Specifically, the demand for non-traded goods depends
positively on the real exchange rate (defined as the price of traded goods
relative to non-traded goods) and real private wealth. Real private wealth,
in turn, depends negatively on revenues from the inflation tax. Hence,
equilibrium in the non-traded goods market requires that the steady-state
inflation rate be that which generates, through its impact on inflation tax
revenues, a level of real private wealth which is consistent with the
targeted real exchange rate. 3/ Therefore, a more depreciated real
exchange rate can only be achieved with higher inflation, kj With regard
to whether money can provide the needed nominal anchor with imperfect
capital mobility, Montiel and Ostry (1992) conclude that such a policy is
not feasible in the long run as an ever widening spread in the parallel
market would lead to a breakdown of the system.
This paper takes a new look at real exchange rate targeting, from both
a theoretical and econometric point of view. Specifically, the purpose of
the paper is two-fold. First, we go back to basics and analyze the two key
questions mentioned above in the context of a simple, neo-classical,
optimizing model. By so doing, we highlight mechanisms which are quite
different from those emphasized by either Adams and Gros (1986) or Lizondo,
1/ Early work by Dornbusch (1982) focused on the effects of PPP rules on
the trade-off between output and price-level variability. Many of the
issues raised by Adams and Gros (1986) had already been discussed at length
in the volume edited by Williamson (1981), mainly in the context of Latin
America.
2/ The essential mechanism provided in Lizondo is retained in the other
three papers.
3/ The elasticity of money demand is assumed to be below unity, so that
higher inflation implies higher revenues from the inflation tax.
4/ Lizondo (1991) implicitly assumes that government expenditure on
traded goods acts as the residual variable in that it accommodates the
higher tax revenues.
- 4 -
(1991, 1993), and Montiel and Ostry (1991, 1992). Second, we test the
main implication of our model for Brazil, Chile, and Colombia. Furthermore,
we also provide empirical evidence on the mechanism emphasized by
Lizondo (1991, 1993) and Montiel and Ostry (1991, 1992).
The analysis is based on a simple representative-consumer, cash-in-
advance model with flexible prices. We first show that, in the absence of
fiscal policy, the steady-state real exchange rate is independent of
(permanent) changes in the rate of devaluation. Hence, al1 that
policymakers can hope to do is to target the real exchange rate for a
limited period of time. Under perfect capital mobility, a more depreciated
level of the real exchange rate--relative to its initial equilibrium value-
can be achieved by generating higher inflation today than in the future.
Intuitively, in a cash-in-advance model, the nominal interest rate affects
the effective price of consumption because money is required to buy goods.
Hence, if inflation, and thus the nominal interest rate, are expected to be
lower in the future than today, consumption of traded goods falls today
relative to the future. Since consumption of home goods cannot change
(because output of home goods is constant), the exchange rate depreciates to
accommodate the lower consumption of traded goods. Hence, targeting a more
depreciated real exchange rate requires that inflation be higher today than
in the future. In this sense, therefore, real exchange rate targeting is
inflationary. Numerical simulations of the model suggest that, since the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution for most developing countries is
relatively low (see Reinhart and Vegh (1993)), the inflationary effects of
real exchange rate targeting might be substantial.
The same results would obtain if one assumes that policymakers attempt
to keep the real exchange rate constant in response to an external positive
shock that would tend it to appreciate. Specifically, in the context of our
model, suppose that the world nominal interest rate falls temporarily. In
the absence of any policy response, such a shock reduces the effective price
of consumption which leads to a current account deficit and a real exchange
rate appreciation. Suppose now that, in the spirit of a PPP rule, the
authorities' goal is to prevent the real exchange rate from appreciating.
They can do that by keeping the domestic nominal interest rate constant;
that is, by increasing the rate of devaluation (and thus the rate of
inflation) by the same amount as the world nominal interest rate falls.
Such a PPP-type of rule will therefore keep the real exchange rate constant
but at the cost of higher inflation (relative to the equilibrium in which
there is no policy response). Hence, in our model, either targeting a more
depreciated real exchange rate or preventing the real exchange rate from
appreciating in response to a positive external shocks is inflationary, 1/
1/ The welfare effects, however, differ. Targeting a more depreciated
level is welfare reducing because there is no initial distortion. In
contrast, keeping the real exchange rate constant is welfare improving
because it offsets the distortion introduced by the temporary external
shock.
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Under no capital mobility, we show that a temporarily more depreciated
real exchange rate can be generated without inflation. However, the
domestic real interest rate rises above its initial value, and keeps
increasing for as long as the real exchange rate remains at its more
depreciated level. Again, a numerical simulation of the model suggests
that the rise in the domestic real interest rate may be substantial.
Therefore, even if the absence of capital mobility enables policymakers to
regain full control over inflation, the effects of real exchange rate
targeting take the form of high real interest rates. In sum, given that in
the real world neither perfect capital mobility nor perfect capital controls
are likely to hold, the model suggests that real exchange rate targeting
will lead to some combination of higher inflation and high domestic real
interest rates.
Given that the analytical framework stresses the role of temporary
shocks to the real exchange rate, the empirical section of the paper
first assesses the relative importance of temporary shocks to the real
exchange rate for Brazil, Chile, and Colombia. To this effect, we use
Cochrane's (1988) methodology, which provides a measure of the persistence
of shocks in a variable by examining the variance of its long differences.
In all three countries considered, it is found that temporary shocks to the
real exchange rate account for a sizable share of the variance of real
exchange rate (between 43 and 62 percent). These results suggest that
our emphasis on temporary shocks to the real exchange rate is well placed.
We then proceed to test, for the same three countries, the main
implication of real exchange rate targeting under perfect capital mobility;
namely, there should be a positive correlation between the temporary
components of inflation and the real exchange rate. 1/ In order to test
the above proposition, we decompose the real exchange rate, which is
nonstationary in all three countries, into its permanent and temporary
components using the Beveridge-Nelson decomposition. We then compute the
correlation between the temporary component of the real exchange rate and
inflation, as both of these variables are stationary. In all three cases,
the correlation has the expected sign and is statistically different from
zero, with values ranging from 0.26 to 0.42. Hence, the evidence supports
the temporary mechanism highlighted in the model.
Finally, we also provide some evidence on the long-run relationship
between revenues from the inflation tax and the real exchange highlighted in
Lizondo (1991, 1993) and Ostry and Montiel (1991, 1992). Our results
suggest that there is room for an indirect link between inflation and the
real exchange rate via wealth effects. However, the evidence is not
conclusive, and further research is required which incorporates other
determinants of the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate, such as
government spending on non-traded goods.
1/ Note that in all the empirical work reported in this paper, a rise in
the real exchange rate index denotes a depreciation.
- 6 -
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
analysis. Section 3 discusses the numerical simulations of the model.
Section 4 contains the econometric work. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
II. The Model
Consider a small open economy inhabited by a large number of identical
individuals blessed with perfect foresight. The representative consumer
derives utility from the consumption of a traded good (whose price in terms
of foreign currency is given and constant over time) and a non-traded (or
home) good. Lifetime utility is given by
J£u<c*,ct)exp<-0t)dt (1)
where c and c denote consumption of traded and home goods, respectively,
and /3(>0) is the subjective discount rate. The instantaneous utility
function, u(.), is twice-continuously differentiable (with positive partial
derivatives), and strictly concave.
The country faces a constant world real interest rate, r. The domestic
real interest rate (in terms of traded goods), p, may differ from the world
real interest rate due to imperfect capital mobility. Let the domestic
discount factor (in terms of traded goods) at tf Dt, be given by
-J^ psds). (2)
Therefore, the representative consumer's lifetime budget constraint is given
by (see Appendix) 1/
(c*+ct/et+itmt)Dtdt( (3)
where y and y denote the endowments of traded and home goods, respectively;
e is the real exchange rate (i.e., the relative price of traded goods in
terms of home goods); r are real lump-sum transfers from the government; and
i denotes the instantaneous nominal interest rate (i.e., the real interest
1/ To simplify notation and without loss of generality, we assume that,
aside from endowment of future output, the individual and the country have
no wealth as of time 0.
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rate, p, plus the rate of devaluation) in terms of domestic currency. 1/
Equation (3) states that the present discounted value of consumption
expenditure, c/e + c*, and the rental cost of money, im, equals the present
discounted value of disposable income, y/e + y + r, all evaluated in terms
of traded goods, and employing the domestic discount factor, D.
Consumers must use money to purchase goods. Formally, they face a
cash-in-advance constraint of the form
a(c* + ct/et) < mt, (4)
where a is a positive constant. Equation (4) requires the stock of real
monetary balances not to fall short of total consumption expenditure, c/e +
c . Constraint (4) holds with equality at equilibrium if the rental cost of
money (i.e., the nominal interest rate) is positive (the only case studied
in the present paper). Therefore, budget constraint (3) can now be
expressed as follows:
<cJ*ct/et)(l+alt)Dtdt. (5)
The representative consumer's optimization problem consists of choosing
the paths of c and c so as to maximize lifetime utility, equation (1),
subject to the intertemporal budget constraint, equation (5), given the
expected (equal to actual, due to perfect foresight) paths of y, y , r , e,
D, and i. The first-order conditions for this problem are 2/
u *(cJ,ct)exp(-/Jt) = ADt(l+ait), (6)
1/ The real exchange rate is defined as e*=EP /P, where E is the nominal
exchange rate, in units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency,
P is the (constant) foreign currency price of traded goods, and P is the
nominal price of home goods.
2/ To ensure the existence of a steady-state and eliminate inessential
dynamics from the case of perfect capital mobility, it will be assumed that
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u •»(c*,ct)
c
uc(c*,ct)
et. (7)
where A is the (constant) Lagrange multiplier associated with budget
constraint (5). Equation (6) indicates that the marginal utility of
consumption of traded goods is proportional to the effective price of
consumption, 1 + cri. The effective price of consumption includes the
opportunity cost of holding the real money balances needed to purchase
goods. Equation (7) equates the marginal rate of substitution between
traded and home goods to their relative price, e.
Assume, for simplicity, that endowments are constant over time; that
3-s> 7t "" y anc* y* ™ y* f°r a ^ *-• Hence, assuming away government
consumption, the market equilibrium conditions for this economy are 1/
(8)
*c*exp(-rt)dt - yl (10)
where ms denotes money supply. Equations (8) and (9) denote the equilibrium
conditions for home goods and money, respectively. Since traded goods can
be freely bought and sold in the rest of the world, equation (10) indicates
that the country is only constrained to spend "within its budget;" namely,
to make the present discounted value of its consumption of traded goods
equal to the present discounted value of its endowment (where flows are
discounted by the constant international interest rate r). 2J
For the sake of concreteness, we will focus on the case in which the
exchange rate is exogenously determined by the monetary authority. A
particular case would be a system of fixed exchange rates. In general,
however, the exchange rate, although still a policy instrument, is allowed
to vary over time. We will study two polar situations: (a) perfect
1/ For the sake of simplicity, no new notation is introduced to denote
equilibrium values.
2/ See the Appendix for the derivation of equation (10).
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international capital mobility, and (b) no international capital mobility
(i.e., perfect capital controls).
1. Perfect capital mobility
Under perfect capital mobility, the domestic real interest rate (in
terms of tradables) equals the international one (i.e,, p-r). Furthermore,
the supply of money, ms, is endogenous, implying that equilibrium condition
(9) always holds. Therefore, under perfect capital mobility, equations (6),
(7) and (8) are reduced to (recall that 0«r):
A(l+alt)f (11)
uc(ct,y)
et. (12)
Consider first steady-state solutions. By equation (12), a constant
real exchange rate is obtained if, and only if, c is constant over time;
which, by equation (11), implies that the monetary authority must engineer a
constant nominal interest rate. Since in this case it - r + et, where e is
the rate of devaluation, we have that a constant i implies a constant rate
of devaluation. In turn, by the overall budget constraint (10), a constant
cx implies c - y*, which is independent of the nominal interest rate, i,
and, therefore, of the rate of devaluation, €. Hence, by (12),
e t = _^ (13)
uc(y .y)
We have thus obtained the intuitively plausible implication that the
steady-state real exchange rate is independent of (permanent changes in) the
rate of devaluation. 1/ In other words, the real exchange rate will be
1/ This property does not hold in Lizondo (1991, 1992) and in Montiel and
Ostry (1991, 1992), because in those models changes in the revenues from the
inflation tax are not returned to the household in a lump-sum way, and thus
affect private wealth. Hence, in these other models it is (implicitly)
assumed that fiscal policy changes with inflation.
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given by (13) for any constant level of the rate of devaluation and thus of
the nominal interest rate. Furthermore, since the utility function is
assumed to be strictly concave, it can be verified that a constant-c path
is a necessary and sufficient condition for a social optimum. Hence, in
this economy it is socially optimal to have a constant rate of devaluation
and, consequently, to generate the (unique) real exchange rate which can be
kept constant over time. Any departure from this constant-real-exchange-
rate path will be non-optimal, which proves, for the case of perfect capital
mobility, that any attempt to depreciate the real exchange rate by monetary
policy (or. to be sure, by any other means) is bound to be socially
costly. 1/
Suppose that the government attempts to depreciate the real exchange
rate over and above the level achieved on the steady-state path. By
previous considerations, such a policy can only attain its objective for a
limited period of time (since we have shown that the steady state is
unique). Since the utility function is strictly concave, it follows from
equation (12) that e rises if, and only if, c falls. By the resource
constraint (10), the latter requires c to rise over its present steady-
state level sometime in the future.
For the sake of clarity, consider the case in which the government sets
the real exchange rate at e*, exceeding its present steady-state level,
from time 0 to time T > 0 (referred to as the "first period") and,
thereafter (referred to as the "second period"), the economy settles to its
new steady state, indicated by e^ (see Figure 3, Panel A). 2/ Thus
denoting the corresponding consumption of traded goods by c and c , we
have, by equation (12), c *• < y*; and, by the resource constraint (10),
c*1 < y < c*2 (see Figure 3, Panel B). Hence, by equation (12), e* is
lower than initial e. Such a path ofc implies, using (11), that i* > i^
or, equivalently, that e^ > e^ (see Figure 3, Panel C). 3/ Since within
each period the relative price of traded goods in terms of home goods, e,
is constant, it follows from the above analysis that the rate of inflation
in period 1 exceeds that of period 2. Under perfect capital mobility,
therefore, the model implies that in order to depreciate the real exchange
rate over and above its current steady-state level, present inflation should
be (and expected to be) higher now than in the future (i.e., inflation is
higher in period 1 than in period 2).
1/ In more realistic examples, the real exchange rate associated with the
social optimum may not be constant over time. However, one could prove in a
wide variety of cases that any attempt to modify the real exchange rate via
monetary policy (specifically, by variable-rate-of-devaluation policy) would
result in an inferior social outcome.
2/ As discussed below, for the resource constraint (10) to hold, e^ must
be below its initial steady-state.
2/ Figure 3, Panel C assumes that the nominal interest increases with
respect to its initial level (see the discussion below).
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Figure 3. Effects of Real Exchange Rate Targeting
A. Real Exchange Rate
time
C. Nominal interest rate(perfect capital mobility)
B. Consumption of traded goods
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D. Real interest rate
(capital controls)
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Notice that the above result is not tantamount to saying that the
current rate of inflation has to increase relative to its past level,
Rather, the result says that the policy must be such that the public expects
inflation to fall over time. Here is where credibility issues come into
play. For example, a present real exchange rate depreciation could be
achieved with lower inflation today, if such action led the public to expect
that inflation will continue falling in the future. However, in practice,
this can only be achieved if the government engages in a credible adjustment
that lowers the fiscal deficit. 1/ Hence, a present unsustainablv low
inflation will lead the public to expect higher, rather than lower,
inflation in the future which, as argued above, would not be consistent with
a real exchange rate depreciation today. Consequently, in the absence of a
credible fiscal adjustment, a policy aimed at depreciating the real exchange
rate is likely to jack up the rate of inflation (i.e., set present inflation
higher than before).
Finally, note that the central result that real exchange rate targeting
is inflationary would remain valid under a PPP-type of rule whereby the real
exchange rate is kept constant in the face of external shocks.
Specifically, consider an initial equilibrium in which foreign inflation is
positive so that i = i + e, where i - r + n . Further, suppose that there
is a temporary fall in foreign inflation and, thus, in the world nominal
interest rate; that is, i ^ < i , In the absence of any policy response,
this positive external shock would lead to a temporary fall in the domestic
nominal interest rate (i.e., i1 < i ), which increases consumption of traded
goods (i.e., c •*• > y > c ^) and causes the real exchange rate to appreciate
(i.e., e^ falls below its initial level). The authorities can prevent
this by setting e higher than e so as to exactly offset the changes in
the world nominal interest rate. In other words, policymakers set
i-L(« i L + £•"-) equal to i^(= i ^ + ez) . By so doing, consumption of traded
goods and, thus, the real exchange rate remain unchanged with respect to the
initial equilibrium (i.e., before the external shock hit) , Hence, the
policy is successful in preventing the real exchange rate from appreciating,
but at the cost of higher inflation (i.e., e^ > e*-) relative to the
situation in which the authorities would not have responded to the external
shock. 2/
2. No capital mobility
Consider now the case in which capital controls are in place. It will
be assumed that such controls can be perfectly enforced so that the stock of
1/ Naturally, this interpretation assumes that the inflation tax is used
to finance in part a given level of government spending. As long as
government spending does not change (i.e., as long as the fiscal adjustment
involves only substituting the inflation tax for conventional taxes), the
above model can be readily reinterpreted in this way since Ricardian
equivalence holds.
2/ We are assuming, of course, that private sector expectations are not
altered by the policy response itself.
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foreign assets in the hands of the public remains constant over time. 1/
It will be shown that, unlike the case of perfect capital mobility, a
temporary real exchange rate depreciation can be obtained with zero
inflation and a constant nominal exchange rate.
Unlike the case of perfect capital mobility, the domestic real
interest rate (in terms of tradables), p, can transitorily differ from the
international one. 2/ Once again, consider the experiment of setting
et = el for 0 < t < T. Since, by assumption, the nominal exchange rate is
fixed (i.e., € - 0), i - p. 3/ Furthermore, equilibrium condition (10)
still holds in this case, implying that c*t - c*1 < y* during the first
period. Thus, as before, if the economy settles down to a steady state
after time T, we have c*t - c*^ > y*f for t > T. 4/ Moreover, by
equations (6) and (7), it is straightforward to show that in a steady state
with fixed exchange rates i - p - /j. We will now show that, during the
first period^ the money supply can be manipulated in order to generate
e = el and c - c*1.
By first-order condition (6), it follows that
u *(c*1fy) - At(l+ait), for 0<t<T, (14)
u *(c ,y) = \j(l+ap)t for t>T, (15)
c
where
At * ADtexp(0t), for 0<t<T , (16)
At - AT, fort>T. (17)
1/ Formally, the model becomes a dual exchange rates regime with no
leakages; see, for instance, Obstfeld (1986) and, in the same cash-in-
advance context, Guidotti and Vegh (1992).
2/ If the system converges to a steady state, however, the domestic real
interest rate converges to the subjective rate of discount f3 which, by
assumption, equals the international real interest rate (in terms of
tradables), r.
.3/ Recall that, by assumption, foreign inflation is zero.
4/ Notice that we can choose the same values of c*-*- and c*^
 a s in the
case of perfect capital mobility, because the economy as a whole faces the
same overall budget constraint (10), independently of the degree of
international capital mobility.
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Therefore, recalling equation (2) and that with fixed exchange rates
i = p, we have
At = At(0 - i t). (18)
Thus, by equations (14) and (18), it follows that
At = \±+P\\t - _ ( for 0<t<T. (19)
a a
By definition (recall equations (14) and (15)), A is continuous with
respect to time. Moreover, from (15), it follows that A must attain a well-
defined level at time T. Formally, then, the equilibrium solution is
associated with the continuous path of A that satisfies dynamic equation
(19) and terminal condition (15). We now have the basic elements to proceed
with the substantive part of the analysis.
We first show that A decreases over time. Suppose, to the contrary,
that A increases over time. This implies, from equation (19), that
(I/a + £)AQ > uc^(c*1,y)/a. Then, since AT > AQ and c*L < c*^, it follows,
using (12), that (I/a + p)Xj > u ^ c ^ . y V a > uc*(c*2 ,y)/a ( which
contradicts terminal condition (15). Therefore, (I/a + P)^o < u c * ( c ,y)/ a
which implies, by equation (19), that A decreases over time. 1/
Consequently, by equation (14), the nominal interest rate increases over
time. Moreover, by equation (14) and the above finding that (I/a + /3)AQ <
^ , it follows that
^ • ( c * 1 ^ ) = A0(l+ai0) > A0(l+a£) (20)
implying that ig > /3. Therefore, if before the attempt to raise the real
exchange rate the economy was in steady-state equilibrium, an
overdepreciated real exchange rate can be sustained by a jump in the
nominal/real interest rate, followed by further rises until the policy is
1/ Note that it cannot be the case that (I/a + /3)AQ = uc*(c ,y)/a. If
that were the case, ^t^O for 0<t<T, and terminal condition (15) would be
violated.
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abandoned at time T (and i goes back to its steady-state level £) , as
illustrated in Figure 3, Panel D. 1/
In sum, the analysis has shown that, under no capital mobility, a
temporary depreciation of the currency in real terms can be achieved without
affecting the inflation rate if it is accompanied by a temporarily tight
credit stance. As expected, tight credit is achieved by lowering real
monetary balances. To prove it, notice that the cash-in-advance constraint
(4) and equilibrium condition (8) imply
mt = c * + X . (21)
et
Hence, m falls at time 0 because e rises and c* increases and remains
constant in each of the periods. Consider the domestic credit policy that
supports such a path of the money supply. At time 0, domestic credit is
reduced to engineer the drop in the money supply. Thereafter, and for the
rest of the first period, the monetary authorities fully sterilize the
reserve inflow that results from the current account surplus, so as to keep
the money supply constant. At time T, domestic credit is increased to
support the higher consumption of traded goods and lower real exchange rate.
The above result testifies to the much greater power that monetary
policy has under imperfect capital mobility. In our example, the real
exchange rate can be changed by manipulating the supply of money but,
remarkably enough, without having to change the rate of inflation. It
should be pointed out, however, that even in the extreme case of no
international capital mobility, temporary changes in the real exchange rate
are socially costly. Actually, our example dramatizes this point since the
associated social costs of temporary changes in the real exchange rate are
identical to those borne under perfect capital mobility. 2/
The power of monetary policy is undermined also in this case if
government policy is not fully credible. Consider, for example, the case
discussed above, in which the public expects high inflation in the future,
irrespective of government announcements. Under those conditions, the
expected future interest rate is largely independent of present
announcements. Hence, in order to provoke a temporary depreciation of the
real exchange rate, the government will be forced to increase current
1/ A PPP-type of rule would lead to similar results, as discussed above
for the perfect capital mobility case. Hence, keeping the real exchange
rate constant in the face of a temporary external shock that would tend to
appreciate would entail high and rising real interest rates relative to the
situation in which there is no policy response.
2/ This point should be obvious as the path of c is the same in both
cases.
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interest rates even further than it would under perfect credibility. In a
more realistic model in which there is a positive stock of short-term
government debt, higher interest rates would worsen the fiscal balance,
possibly generating the high inflation expected by the public.
III. Simulation of the Model
The previous section presented a simple example in which the government
is able to temporarily set the real exchange rate at a more depreciated
level than in the steady-state by either raising inflation in the present
relative to the future (under perfect capital mobility) or increasing real
interest rates (under no capital mobility). This section discusses a
numerical illustration of the model to get a sense of the orders of
magnitudes involved. 1/ Specifically, we are Interested in assessing how
much inflation and real interest rates must rise to generate a given
depreciation of the real exchange rate. 2/
For the purposes of simulating the model, we need to specify
preferences. Assume that the instantaneous utility function exhibits
constant relative risk aversion:
i-l
z t * -1
u(c ct) = _E (22)
1-1
where r?(>0) is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and z, an index
of- total consumption takes the Cobb-Douglas functional form:
(23)
where q denotes the share of traded-goods consumption in total consumption.
We now have all the elements needed to simulate the model under both perfect
capital mobility and capital controls.
1/ See Reinhart and Vegh (1992) for a similar numerical exercise under
perfect capital mobility aimed at assessing the quantitative importance of
imperfect credibility in exchange rate-based stabilization programs.
2/ For the sake of concreteness, we will assume that the nominal interest
rate does not change across steady-states and is equal to r (i.e., steady-
state inflation is zero). Hence, in the first period the nominal Interest
rate is higher than in the initial steady-state.
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1. Perfect capital mobility
Taking into account equations (22) and (23) , first-order conditions
(11) and (12) become:
(24)
q y
(l-q)c'
=e t. (25)
Using (24), (25), and resource constraint (10), a closed-form solution
for c* can be derived:
PX (26)
j o p ^ exp(-rt)dt
where
p t - 1 + ait. (27)
**
To simplify notation, equation (27) defines the effective price of
consumption, while equation (28) defines the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution relevant for traded goods. 1/ Note that if i, and thus p,
1/ It should be noted that, when q = 1, equation (26) reduces to the
closed-form solution that would hold in a one-good model (see Reinhart and
Vegh (1992)). Thus, this two-good setting makes clear that the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution relevant for traded-goods
consumption, 17 , may differ from the elasticity of substitution of aggregate
consumption, rj. Note that if q = 1, then rj = 7}. However, if 77 < 1 (the
relevant case in practice, see below), rjx > r\.
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are constant over time, then the term that multiplies y* on the right-hand
side of equation (26) is unity, which implies that c*. — y for all t. If i,
and thus p, vary over time, then c will also vary over time. In this case,
the parameter t} plays a key role in determining the response of c .
Specifically, if p is higher in the present than in the future, then today's
consumption of traded goods is lower than in the future. The higher is ryx,
the smaller will be today's consumption relative to future consumption.
To make equation (26) operational, we need to make explicit the path of
i and thus p. Following the theoretical example, suppose that it - i^ for
0<t<T and it - i2 for t>T, where i1 > i2. Then, denoting by p 1 and p 2 the
respective effective prices (i.e., p-^  = 1 + ai^ and p 2 - 1 + ai2 , where
P > P )» equation (26) reduces to:
c* - y* l-exp(-rT)+( P )"f?*exp(-rT) for 0<t<T. (29){ P 1 J
where p and r/* are defined in equations (27) and (28), respectively. (An
analogous expression holds for t>T.)
Using equations (25), (27), (28) and (29), we can compute the nominal
interest rate which is needed to generate a given depreciation of the
exchange rate. 1/ Assuming that i2 — r - 0.03, Table 1 shows the nominal
interest rate (in monthly effective terms) which generates during period 1 a
real depreciation of 5, 10, and 15 percent for different values of rj and T
(expressed in years). 2/2/ For example, if TJ - 0.4 and T - 1/2 (half a
year), then the nominal interest rate needs to be 4.97 percent per month (or
79.0 percent per year) for the real exchange rate to depreciate by
5 percent.
Four observations follow from the figures reported in Table 1:
1/ Specifically, we take i2 as given and vary i so as to generate
through equation (29) the value of c that implies through equation (25)
the desired depreciation of the real exchange rate.
2/ Note that i is an interest rate which is capitalized instantaneously.
Hence, if i is 3 percent, the corresponding yearly effective rate is
3.05 percent and the monthly rate is 0.25 percent. In what follows, and
unless otherwise noticed, all interest rates are in expressed in effective
terms.
2/ The following parameter values were used: a =0.15, q = 0.4,
r = 0.03. Without loss of generality (since we are only concerned with
percentage changes), y and e were normalized to one. The values of a and q
were chosen based on actual data. Specifically, the ratio of Ml to private
consumption was 20.0 for Brazil in 1987, 10.7 for Chile in 1991, and
16.7 for Colombia in 1988 (data from IFS). The value of q, based on the
average share of traded-goods consumption during the period 1978-1986, was
0.47 for Brazil and 0.32 for Colombia (see Reinhart and Ostry (1992)).
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a. The inflationary consequences of engineering a temporary
depreciation of the real exchange rate are likely to be substantial. Even
though these figures should be viewed as an upper bound—given that in
practice capital mobility is less than perfect--the order of magnitude is
large enough to suggest that the inflationary effects would still be large
under less than perfect capital mobility.
b. The real exchange rate target has a substantial effect on the
inflation upsurge. In other words, for a given value of the intertemporal
elasticiy of substitution (say, 0.4), targeting a real depreciation of
15 percent during one year results in considerable more inflation (a nominal
interest rate of 15.55 percent per month) than targeting a real depreciation
of 5 percent (a nominal interest rate of 4.97 percent per month).
c. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution plays a key role.
Since the mechanism through which the real exchange rate depreciation is
effected is intertemporal consumption substitution, it is not surprising
that the magnitude of this parameter critically affects the inflationary
consequences of real exchange rate targeting. For instance, for T=l and a
real exchange rate depreciation of 10 percent, the nominal interest rate
varies from 23.78 to 6.83 percent per month as r\ varies from 0.15 to 0.8.
As reported in Reinhart and Vegh (1993), intertemporal elasticities of
substitution in developing countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Israel, Mexico, and Uruguay are clustered around 0.20. 1/ Hence, these
low values of rj are likely to exacerbate the inflationary consequences of
real exchange rate targeting.
d. The time period during which policymakers seek to maintain a more
depreciated exchange rate level is relatively unimportant. As Table 1
shows, the values of the parameter T make little difference to the
inflationary effects. For instance, for a real depreciation of 5 percent
and r] - 0.15, the nominal interest rate varies only from 10.57 to
11.10 percent per month as T varies from half a year to two years. Hence,
what matters is not so much the time period during which the more
depreciated real exchange rate is maintained, but rather the desired target
level.
1/ Reinhart and Vegh (1993) use for estimation purposes a monetary model
very similar to the present cash-in-advance model, but which allows for
variable velocity. Depending on the parameters of the money demand,
estimates for r\ lie in the range 0.18-0.19 for Argentina, 0.07-0.13 for
Brazil, 0.24-0.80 for Chile, 0.16-0.22 for Israel, 0.11-0.19 for Mexico, and
0.04-0.17 for Uruguay. With the exception of Uruguay for some parameters of
the money demand, all estimates are statistically significantly different
from zero. In a real model, using panel data which includes Brazil and
Colombia, Ostry and Reinhart (1992) estimate the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution to be around 0.4.
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Table 1. Nominal Interest Rate Needed to Generate a Given Depreciation
(In percent per month)
T = 0 5
T=1
T=2
Inteitemporal
elasticity of
substitution
0.15
0.4
0.8
0.15
0.4
0.8
0.15
0.4
0.8
5 percent
10.57
4.97
3.43
10.75
5.05
3.48
11.10
5.20
3.58
Depreciation of real exchange
10 percent
23.35
10.07
6.73
23.78
10.22
6.83
24.67
10.55
7.05
rate
15 percent
39.26
15.55
10.15
40.06
15.81
10.31
41.74
16.34
10.63
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2. No capital mobility
In spite of having intrinsic dynamics, the model with capital controls
model is simple enough to lend itself to an easy numerical solution. Our
objective is to compute the initial and final values of the real interest
rate path (i.e., pQ and p^-) , depicted in Figure 3, Panel D, that generates
a temporarily depreciated real exchange rate. The values of c** and c*^ are
the ones that follow from the perfect capital mobility case since, by
construction, the policy under capital controls studied in Section 3
supports such a path.
Since no additional insights are derived from solving the model, we
will only indicate how the model is solved without reporting the solution
itself. The linear differential equation (19) can be solved to obtain AQ as
a function of A-p and c . Since we know both A^ (which follows from
equation (15) using equations (22) and (23)) and c ^, AQ can be computed.
Given AQ and c , 1Q(*=PQ) can be computed from equation (14), using
equations (22) and (23) . The value of i-j»- can be computed in the same way
by recalling that A is continuous at t-T.
The results of the simulation are reported in Table 2. Each entry
reports two values of the real interest rate path depicted in Figure 3,
Panel D: the first is the value of the real interest rate at time 0, while
the second is the value at time T" (i.e, just before the real exchange rate
falls). In general, the initial increase in real interest rates is rather
small. 1/ However, the real interest eventually reaches high, and in some
cases exorbitant, levels. Note that the final value taken by the real
interest rate (or the nominal interest rate) coincides with the value that
the nominal interest rate takes in the perfect capital mobility case, as a
comparison of Tables 1 and 2 reveals. This should not come as a surprise
since terminal condition (15) also holds under perfect capital mobility,
which implies that A^=A. Hence, since consumption is the same in both
cases, p^-(=ij-) (under no capital mobility) equals i^ (under perfect
capital mobility).
The same observations made for the case of perfect capital mobility
apply here. In particular, the key parameters are the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution and the target level of the real interest rate.
The time frame during which the more depreciated real exchange rate is in
effect plays a minor role.
In conclusion, it should be borne in mind that Tables 1 and 2 represent
two extreme situations--perfect capital mobility and perfect capital
immobility--neither of which is likely to hold in practice. In the real
world, the applicable scenario will be somewhere in between, even when it
1/ The steady-state value of the real interest rate is 0.25 percent per
month. In all the entries of Table 2, the value of the real interest rate
at time 0 is higher than the steady-state value, although in some cases this
is not evident from the table as figures have been rounded to two decimals.
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Table 2. Real Interest Rate Needed to Generate a Given Depreciatbn
(In percent per month)
J=0J5
T=1
T=2
Intertemporal
elasticity of
substitution
0.15
0.4
0.8
0.15
0.4
0.8
0.15
0.4
0.8
5 percent
0.55-10.57
0.40-4.97
0.35-3.43
0.26-10.75
0.26-5.05
0.25-3.48
0.25-11.10
0.25-5.20
0.25-3.58
Depreciation of real exchange
10 percent
0.79-23.35
0.53-10.07
0.45-6.73
0.27-23.78
0.26-10.22
0.26-6.83
0.25-24.67
0.25-10.55
0.25-7.05
rate
15 percent
0.99-39.26
0.65-15.55
0.53-10.15
0.27-40.06
0.26-15.81
0.26-10.31
0.25-41.74
0.25-16.34
0.25-10.63
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has been moving towards the perfect capital mobility case during the last
20 years. Therefore, in practice, targeting a over-depreciated real
exchange rate for a limited period of time is bound to result in both higher
inflation and higher real interest rates. Under this interpretation,
Tables 1 and 2 suggest upper bounds for the order of magnitudes involved.
IV. Empirical Implications
The model outlined in Section 2 implies that the steady-state real
exchange rate is independent of (permanent changes) in monetary policy.
Hence, there is no direct steady-state link between inflation and the real
exchange rate. 1/ Hence, the monetary authorities' impact on the real
exchange rate is, at best, transitory. This section examines some of the
main empirical implications of the theoretical framework. Given that the
model emphasizes temporary changes in the real exchange rate, we first
assess the relative importance of temporary shocks in explaining the total
variability of the real exchange rate for Brazil, Chile, and Colombia. 2/
We then examine empirically the main implication of the model: if there is
some measure of capital mobility, inflation will accelerate during episodes
in which the real exchange rate is depreciated relative to its permanent,
"steady-state" level. To this end, we compute the correlation between
inflation and the "cyclical" component of the real exchange rate, as the
latter captures transitory deviations from its steady-state level.
Quarterly data for the real exchange rate and consumer prices for the
period January 1978 to December 1992 are employed. The empirical analysis
that follows requires that the individual time series properties of the
variables of interest be known beforehand. The results of the augmented
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (P-P) tests, which are reported in
Table 3, indicate that the real excharige rate and the price level have one
unit root (i.e., they are difference stationary). Therefore, inflation is a
stationary variable. 2/ The unit root tests, however, do not provide
information on the relative importance of the permanent component.
1. Temporary shocks to the real exchange rate
To determine how important a role temporary shocks play in explaining
real exchange rate variability, we employ Cochrane's (1988) methodology,
which provides a measure of the persistence of shocks to a variable by
examining the variance of its long differences. Specifically, if the
variable x has the following representation,
1/ In other models, there exists a steady-state relationship between
inflation and the real exchange rate (see below).
2/ Of course, other policy actions not discussed in this paper, such as
changes in government spending on nontraded goods will have permanent
effects on the real exchange rate (see for example, Edwards (1989)).
3/ When the test results give conflicting results (for instance,
inflation in Colombia), a higher weight is attached to the P-P tests, which
allow for more general forms of heteroskedasticity.
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Table 3. The Unit Root Tests
1979:11-1992:11
Regression: Ayt * /i + fit + ayt-l + 52 &&yt-i + et
Series
t-statistic on a
(A.D.F. statistic)
Phillips-Perron
statistic
Real Exchange Rate
Brazil 1
Chile 3
Colombia 1
•2.9837
•2.3568
-1.8625
•2.1865
•1.9772
-1.5359
Inflation
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
1
4
3
-4.2494
-3.5976
-1.8841
-3.8506
-4.9324
-6.4724
Critical values 17. 57.
50 observations 1/ -4.18 -3.51
10X
-3.18
1/ The critical values are taken from Guilkey and Schmidt (1989).
Notes: The real exchange rate is in logs while inflation is measured as
the first difference of the log of the price level. The actual number of
observations is 52.
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xt = 6xt-i + 6 t , where et ~ N(O,a2 €) . (30)
then if 6=1, x follows a pure random walk and the variance of its k-
differences grows linearly with the difference
var(xt - ^ t-\d ' ko e . (31)
If <5<1 and x is a stationary process, the variance of its k-differences is
given by
var(xt -xt-k) = tr2€(l-<52k)/(l-<52) (32)
Therefore, the ratio (l/k)var(xt-xt_jc)/var(xt-xt_^) is equal to one if x
follows a random walk process and converges to zero if x is stationary.
If x has both permanent (random walk) and temporary (stationary) components,
the ratio will converge to the ratio of the variance of the permanent shock
to the total variance of x. Thus, the closer that ratio is to unity, the
lower is the relative importance of temporary shocks.
Table 4 summarizes the main results. The values of k range between one
and ten years. In all three countries considered, temporary shocks account
for a sizable share of the variance of the real exchange rate. Temporary
shocks are most important for Chile (62 percent of the variance) and least
important (43 percent of the variance) for Brazil. Colombia falls in the
middle of the range with temporary shocks accounting for about 54 percent of
the variance of the real exchange rate.
On balance, these results would seem to indicate that, for these
countries, temporary shocks play an important role in the behavior of real
exchange rates. Hence, at least in this respect, the theoretical framework
outlined in sections 2 and 3 is not devoid of empirical content. Our
results contrast with those of Edwards (1989), who tentatively concludes
temporary shocks play a relatively small role in determining the behavior of
real exchange rates.
Edwards' (1989) conclusion is based on the results of a regression
which has the level of the real exchange rate as the dependent variable, and
includes as explanatory variables both permanent and temporary components of
the terms of trade, government spending, and other "real" variables (see
Edwards (1989)). The main problem with that approach is that not all
variables appearing in the regression are integrated of the same order,
which will bias the results towards finding no role for temporary shocks.
Note that both the real exchange rate and, by construction, the "permanent
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Table 4. 1/k Times the Variance of k-differences of
the Real Exchange Rate
9 0
ak /al f° r various k (Quarters)
16 24 32 40
Brazil
1.07
(0.015)
1.041
(0.017)
0.64
(0.021)
0.863
(0.027)
0.75
(0.028)
Chile
0.704
(0.031)
0.47
(0.030)
0.513
(0.031)
Colombia
0
(0
.376
.012)
1.494 1.217 0.953 0.687 0.465
(0.017) (0.027) (0.031) (0.031) (0.012)
1/ Quarterly data was used. The real exchange rate indices are from the
Information Notice System, IMF. Standard errors are in parentheses. The
standard errors were tabulated from Monte Carlo simulations (600
replications) for n~62 and k-32 and 40, under the null hypothesis of a
random walk.
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component" of all the explanatory variables are non-stationary. 1/
However, also by construction, the "temporary component" of all explanatory
variables is stationary. Hence, regression methods, such as OLS, will
attach zero coefficients to all the stationary variables appearing in the
right hand side, since asymptotically there can be no relationship between a
nonstationary and stationary variable. However, such lack of statistical
significance of the temporary components was taken as evidence that
temporary shocks were not an important factor in real exchange rate
behavior.
The methodology outlined here is more direct and does not require any
estimation. However, it is important to note that this methodology does not
discriminate among "types" of temporary shocks. It does not distinguish
between a "temporary policy shock", such as the one considered in the
previous exercise, from say, a temporary terms-of-trade shock, which
underlies Edwardsf s (1989) exercise.
2. Inflation and the real exchange rate
The theoretical model suggests that inflation will accelerate when the
authorities attempt to depreciate the real exchange rate beyond its
equilibrium level. To examine this proposition we follow a two-step
approach. First, employing the Beveridge-Nelson technique (Beveridge and
Nelson (1981)) as modified by Miller (1988), we decompose the exchange rate
into its "permanent" (or steady-state) component and "temporary" (or
cyclical component). As discussed above, the identifying criteria for this
technique is that the former captures the nonstationary component of the
variable, while the latter captures its stationary element. Table A.I, in
the Appendix, provides details about the ARMA processes that best described
the real exchange rate for the three countries in our sample, while
Appendix A.2 discusses the links between the "economic fundamentals" and the
trend and cycle. Second, we examine the pairwise correlations between the
cyclical component of the real exchange rate and inflation (which was also
shown to be a stationary variable).
The inverse of the IMF index of the real exchange rate is used; hence,
as in the theoretical model, an increase in the index denotes a real
depreciation. When the cyclical component is negative, the actual exchange
rate is "overvalued" relative to its equilibrium steady-state level. Hence,
the model suggests that we should observe a positive correlation between
inflation and the cyclical or temporary component of the real exchange rate.
The corresponding correlations and their standard errors are reported in
Table 5. In all three cases considered, the correlation has the anticipated
sign and is significant at the 10 percent confidence level or higher. In
all cases, the correlation is relatively low (0.26 to 0.42 range),
suggesting that there are also important differences in the driving forces
behind these two variables. This low correlation is evident from Figure 4,
which plots Inflation and the cyclical component of the real exchange rate.
1/ The Beveridge-Nelson (1981) trend-cycle decomposition was used.
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Figure 4. Temporary Component of Real Exchange Rate
and Inflation
Brazil
Log Level
0.04-
0.02-
0.00
-Q.02'
-O.0O-1—r
Real Exchange Rate
(toft ecale)
\ I Inflation Rate
\j (right «*!•)
Percent per quarter
Chile
Log Level Percent p*r y«ar
Real Exchange Rate
(left scale)
Log Level
Colombia
Percent per year
67
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics and Fund staff estimates.
Note: A decrease in the real effective exchange rate index denotes an appreciation.
Inflation is computed as the change in the CPI over the previous quarter for Brazil
and over the previous four quarters for Chile and Colombia.
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Table 5. Pairwise Correlations 1/
1979:IV-1992:2
Country Brazil Chile Colombia
Inflation
Real Exchange Rate 2/
Cyclical Component of the
Real Exchange Rate
Real Exchange Rate
Cyclical Component of the
Real Exchange Rate
0.092
(0.148)
0.257
(0.144)
Cyclical
-0.224
(0.145)
0.265
(0.144)
0.066
(0.146)
0.293
(0.139)
Component
0.415
(0.133)
0.423
(0.132)
0.324
(0.135)
0.333
(0.134)
of Inflation
0.196
(0.140)
0.362
(0.133)
1/ Standard errors of the correlation coefficients are in parentheses.
2/ The correlations with the real exchange rate are only meant to be
illustrative. Inference-making cannot proceed as usual given that the real
exchange rate is 1(1) and inflation is 1(0). Such problems do not arise
with the correlations involving the cyclical component of the real exchange
rate, which by construction is 1(0),
Notes: The real exchange rate is in logs while inflation is measured as
the first difference of the log of the price level. The trend-cycle
decomposition of the real exchange rate was obtained using the Beveridge-
Nelson technique. The ARMA processes that model the change in the permanent
component are presented in Table A.I in the Appendix. Since inflation was
found to be stationary around a deterministic trend, the bottom panel of the
this table reports the correlations for the cyclical deviations from trend.
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By contrast, no systematic relationship is evident from the
correlations of the (log) level of the real exchange rate and inflation in
two of the three countries (see Table 5). 1/ This lack of a systematic
relationship between inflation and the real exchange rate has fueled the
observation that Chile represents a case of successful real exchange rate
targeting, in the sense that a policy of targeting the real exchange rate
coexisted with declining inflation rates (see Edwards (1991)). The above
results would suggest, however, that the lack of inflationary pressures in
the case of Chile possibly stemmed from having a real exchange rate target
that was, in effect, closely tracking the equilibrium real exchange rate.
However, as in Brazil and Colombia, the evidence suggests that in periods
when the real exchange rate was depreciated relative to its steady-state
level inflation did tend to accelerate. 2/
In sum, the empirical exercises summarized in this section yield two
main observations, both of which are consistent with the theoretical model:
(i) temporary shocks play an important role in explaining real exchange rate
behavior, and (ii) there appears to be a systematic relationship between
real exchange rate disequilibria and inflation.
3. Implications of other models
The theoretical model outlined in this paper has stressed the
relationship between the temporary or cyclical component of the real
exchange rate and inflation. However, other models (see Lizondo (1991,
1993) and Montiel and Ostry (1991, 1992)) have focused on the relationship
between inflation and the "permanent" or steady-state real exchange rate.
Specifically, the relationship between these two variables implied by these
models is an indirect one (in the sense that there is an implied
relationship between revenues from the inflation tax, rather than inflation,
and the real exchange rate), and comes through from wealth effects. 3/ In
these models, the steady-state real exchange rate is determined by market
clearing in the nontraded good sector. Demand for the nontraded good
depends on its relative price (i.e. the real exchange rate), and wealth,
which, in turn, depends on the inflation tax. Changes in the inflation tax
affect household wealth because it is assumed that the government does not
return revenues from the inflation tax to the household via a lump-sum
transfer. Rather, the government uses these revenues to either Increase
spending on traded goods or accumulate international reserves. Hence, these
models predict that the steady-state real exchange rate can be depreciated
1/ This is not surprising, since the two variables have different orders
of integration any relationship is bound to be spurious.
2/ See Herrera (1991) and Carrasquilla (1992), who note for the case of
Colombia that periods of real exchange rate disequilibria (in the sense of
an overdepreciated real exchange rate) were characterized by inflationary
pressures.
3/ As discussed above, for the countries in our sample, inflation Is
stationary while the real exchange rate is not. Hence, no direct steady-
state relationship can exist between these two variables.
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by permanently increasing the inflation rate. 1/ An increase in inflation
reduces households' wealth and decreases their demand for the nontraded
good. As a result, the real exchange rate must depreciate to restore
equilibrium in the market for home goods.
The empirical examination of a steady-state relationship between
inflation and the real exchange rate is far from trivial because, in
principle, there are a host of other variables (terms of trade, government
spending, etc) that affect the steady-state real exchange rate, and which
should be incorporated into the empirical analysis. At the very least,
however, and given that we have in mind the equilibrium in the home goods
market, the supply of home goods must be taken into account. Hence, to
explore some of the empirical implications of these models we proceed in two
steps. First, we establish the time series properties of the inflation tax
and GDP (the latter will serve as a proxy for output of the nontraded good).
As is well known, a steady-state relationship can only exist among variables
which are integrated of the same order. Hence, the inflation tax and real
GDP must be difference stationary (same as the real exchange rate) if the
steady state relationship postulated by these models is to have empirical
content. Second, for the cases where the all the variables are integrated
of the same order, we proceed to examine via cointegration tests if a
steady-state relationship among them can be identified.
Applying the same battery of tests as before, in all three countries
considered, GDP per capita and the inflation tax (also on a per capita
basis) were found to be nonstationary (however, the inflation tax as a
percent of GDP is stationary). 2/ Hence, based on the individual unit
root tests there is no a priori basis for ruling out the steady-state
relationship postulated by Lizondo (1991, 1993) and Montiel and
Ostry (1991, 1992).
To examine whether output and the inflation tax are sufficient to pin
down the steady-state behavior of the real exchange rate we performed the
cointegration tests of Johansen (1988, 1990). The results summarized in
Table 6 report the A-max and trace statistics, as well as their respective
critical values. In addition, the estimated parameters for the
cointegrating vectors (if these exist) are also reported at the bottom of
the table. Cointegration among the real exchange rate, real GDP per capita
(a proxy for output of nontraded goods), and the inflation tax per capita
was only detected for Colombia. If the assumption of a single traded good
is relaxed, and a distinction is made between importables and exportables,
the equilibrium real exchange rate also depends on the terms of trade (see
for example, Edwards (1989)). Including the terms of trade in the vector of
variables was particularly important for Chile. Once the terms of trade are
included, cointegration obtains (see Table 6 and critical values for n=4).
Hence any meaningful inference will be limited to those two cases.
1/ It is assumed that real money demand is inelastic, so that an increase
in inflation raises revenues from the inflation tax.
2/ These results are not reported but are available upon request.
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Table 6. Cointegration Tests for the Real Exchange Rate, the
Inflation Tax, and Real GDP 1/
Country Brazil Chile Colombia
A-max
Trace
11.530
15.904
Coefficient estimates:
Inflation tax
Real GDP
Terms of trade
36.410
60.769
0.102
(0.034)
0.747
(0.223)
-0.312
(0.040)
30.068
43.917
0.130
(0.024)
2.445
(0.426)
n-3 n-4
Critical values for A-max:
at 95 % confidence level -
at 90 % confidence level •
Critical values for trace;
at 95 % confidence level -
at 90 % confidence level -
25.54
23.11
42.44
39.06
31.46
29.12
62.99
59.14
1/ Coefficients are only reported when cointegration obtains.
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The number of lags in the
vector autoregression is three. The critical values are those under the
null of no cointegration. The source of the critical values is Osterwald-
Lenum (1992). For the specification that includes the terms of trade, the
A-max and trace statistics for Brazil are 25.08 and 50.44, respectively.
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The Stock-Watson (1991) estimates of coefficients of the cointegrating
vectors, which deal with the biases introduced in the cointegrating
regressions by simultaneity and serial correlation in the errors, indicate
that the variables enter significantly and with the anticipated signs.
Hence, an expansion in output depreciates the real exchange rate, implying a
positive coefficient; similarly, an increase in the inflation tax
depreciates the equilibrium real exchange rate. An improvement in the terms
of trade, other things equal, tends to appreciate the equilibrium real
exchange rate (a negative coefficient). For the case of Brazil, little
inference is possible as cointegration did not obtain. 1/ The persistent
lack of cointegration for Brazil is likely indicative of a misspecification
problem, possibly due to omitted variables or perhaps to the linearity
imposed in the cointegration tests. The relationship among the real
exchange rate and the explanatory variables indicated by these models may
simply be nonlinear. As suggested in Lizondo (1991), a leading candidate in
this list of potential omissions is public expenditure on nontraded
goods. 2/
Our results tend to suggest that there is potential for quantitatively
important indirect links between inflation and the equilibrium real exchange
rate. However, the evidence is not conclusive, which suggests that a more
comprehensive model of equilibrium real exchange rate determination may be
needed to be able to quantify the relationship between the real exchange
rate and the inflation tax.
V. Final remarks
Policies of targeting the real exchange rate are often pursued by
developing countries that are trying to either maintain or enhance their
international competitiveness. A simple optimizing model offers sharp
predictions about the feasibility and macroeconomic consequences of such a
policy. First, this framework suggests that the monetary authorities can
only have a transitory impact on the real exchange rate; thus the model
stresses the role of "temporary policy shocks", which have been largely
ignored in the literature on the subject. Second, when there is perfect
capital mobility, a policy that aims at depreciating the real exchange rate
results in a temporarily higher inflation rate; when there is no capital
mobility, the impact of the policy rule is reflected in higher real interest
rates. Since neither extreme adequately depicts reality, the implication to
be drawn is that an attempt to depreciate the real exchange rate beyond its
equilibrium level is likely to be accompanied by both higher inflation and
rising real interest rates.
1/ Indeed, the variables appear with the anticipated signs, but since
these parameter estimates are neither unbiased nor consistent no conclusions
are possible.
2/ See Roldos (1990) for some empirical evidence on the effects of
government spending and other exogenous variables on the real exchange rate.
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Simulations of the model based on available parameter estimates were
used to quantify the suggested tradeoff between international
competitiveness and inflation and/or higher real interest rates. These
exercises revealed that this tradeoff is likely to be steep. For instance,
an attempt by the monetary authorities to push the real exchange rate
10 percent beyond its equilibrium level may require an inflation rate of
about 10 percent per month. Moreover, the lower the degree of intertemporal
substitution, the steeper the tradeoff. Since the empirical evidence
suggests intertemporal elasticities of substitution in developing countries
are relatively low, the tradeoff between a more depreciated real exchange
rate and higher inflation is likely to be substantial.
This paper also attempts to fill a gap in the literature on real
exchange rate targeting by providing empirical evidence of some of the key
implications of the existing models. Three main stylized facts emerge from
the experiences of Brazil, Chile and Colombia: first, temporary shocks,
including (but not necessarily limited to) the type of policy shock outlined
in the theoretical framework play an important role in determining real
exchange rate behavior; second, partial correlations between the inflation
rate and the cyclical or temporary component of the real exchange rate
indicate that as suggested by the model, inflation increases when the real
exchange rate is depreciated relative to its steady-state level; third, our
results suggest that there is room for an indirect link between inflation
and the real exchange rate via wealth effects. However, the evidence for
the latter is not conclusive, and further research is required which
incorporates other determinants of the long-run equilibrium real exchange
rate, such as government spending on non-traded goods.
Since our empirical conclusions are based on the experience of three
countries that have had one or more episodes of policies aimed at targeting
the real exchange rate, a fruitful line for future research would broaden
the coverage to include a more diverse group of countries that have had
similar policies in place. Only by studying a more comprehensive sample of
countries are the main empirical regularities associated with real exchange
rate targeting likely to emerge. In addition, this paper has focused almost
exclusively on the direct and indirect links between inflation and real
exchange rate targeting. A more comprehensive evaluation of macroeconomic
consequences of these policies would also have to examine the behavior of
other key variables, such as exports, the current account, and growth.
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APPENDIX I
1. Derivation of some expressions in the text
Under capital controls (modeled as a dual exchange rates regime), the
consumer's flow constraint is given by (see, for instance, Guidotti and
Vegh (1992)):
at = Z* + y * - _ll - c* + Ptqtbt - €t^t + 't-
where b is the real net stock of bonds; q is the domestic price of real
bonds; a(=m+qb) denotes real financial assets; and r are real transfers from
the government. Multiplying equation (33) by Dt, integrating forward, and
imposing the standard transversality condition, equation (3) in the text
follows (note that i«p+c).
In order to derive the resource constraint (10), consider the
government's flow constraint:
r
^t ~ rt»
where h denotes the government's net stock of bonds. Combining (33) and
(34), it follows that
h t + q tb t - y t - c t • r(ht+bt) . (35)
Under perfect capital mobility, q^l; under capital controls, bt-b0 for all t
so that bt=0. In either case, integrating equation (3) forward and imposing
the appropriate transversality condition yields equation (10), where kQ=0.
2. Trend-cycle decomposition and the "economic fundamentals"
The Beveridge-Nelson approach to decomposing a time series into its
permanent and cyclical components relies exclusively on the univariate
behavior of the series in question and, hence, it is silent as to how trend
and cycle interact with other economic variables. The purpose of this
appendix is to briefly examine whether the constructed trends and cycles of
the real exchange rate are linked to economic fundamentals. We focus on the
cycle and subsequently consider the behavior of the "equilibrium" permanent
component.
As noted in the text, the cyclical component of the real exchange rate
is correlated with inflation in a way predicted by theory. In addition, the
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constructed cycle appears to be consistent with consumption-smoothing
behavior, at least in the cases of Chile and Colombia. Figure Al. plots the
actual real exchange rate alongside the permanent component. When the
actual is below equilibrium the real exchange rate is "temporarily
overvalued", This was the case for Chile during 1980-85 and again in 1991-
present. A similar pattern is evident in Colombia, with evidence of
overvaluation prior to 1984 and in the post-1991 period. Consumption-
smoothing suggests that temporary overvaluations would be associated with
wider current account deficits and increased capital inflows. In effect,
these characteristics describe the periods mentioned fairly well. For
Chile, during 1980-82 (the period with the largest suggested overvaluation),
the current account deficit as a share of GDP averaged 10.4 percent. This
was financed by capital inflows of similar orders of magnitude. By
contrast, the 1986-1990 period recorded a current account deficit of
3.4 percent and capital outflows of 3.1 percent. During 1991-93, the
current account continued to shrink, but the balance on the capital account
swung markedly, with recorded inflows amounting to 5.7 percent of GDP. The
pattern for Colombia is similar, although the swings are less pronounced.
During 1980-82 capital inflows amount to 6 percent of GDP, these shrink to
0.7 percent during 1985-90, and inflows accelerate in recent years,
averaging 1.2 percent in 1991-93. 1/
With regard to the macroeconomic determinants of the permanent
component of the real exchange rate, we proceed, as before, to examine if a
cointegrating relationship can be detected among the "permanent" component
and real GDP per capita (a proxy for output of nontraded goods), the
inflation tax per capita, and the terms of trade. The results mimic those
reported in Table 6 in both the presence (or absence) of cointegration and
the signs on the coefficients for the two cases (Chile and Colombia) where a
cointegrating equation is found. Interestingly, in the case of Chile where
the terms of trade is a crucial variable, the relationship among the two
relative prices appears to be between the permanent components of the real
exchange rate and the terms of trade; their respective cycles are
uncorrelated.
1/ It is important to note, that the figures for Colombia understate
importantly the recent surge in capital inflows, as some of the capital
inflows were being recorded as transfers in the current account.
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Figure A.1. Real Exchange Rates: Trends and Cycles
Brazil
LogL«v*4
Chile
LogL*v«l
.4.9 *• 1 • 1 i 1 1 1
60 92
Colombia
.3.6-
LogLtvel
-4.8
-5.0
Permanent
Component
90 9082 94 $6 86
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics and Fund staff estimates.
Note: A decrease in the real effective exchange rate index denotes an appreciation.
Inflation is computed as the change in the CPI over the previous quarter for Brazil
and over the previous four quarters for Chile and Colombia.
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Table Al. Beveridge-Nelson Decompositions
of the Real Exchange Rate
Modelling the change in the permanent component as an ARMA process 1/
Country:
ARMA(p,q)
Constant
AR(1)
AR(2)
AR(3)
AR(4)
AR(5)
MA(1)
MA(2)
MA(3)
R2
Q'statistic
Significance level
Brazil
Ouarterlv:
ARMA(1,O)
-0.002
(0.012)
0.234
(0.103)
******
******
******
******
******
******
******
0.164
20.571
(0.485)
Chile
1978:1-1992:
ARMA(4,3)
-0.003
(0.392)
1.688
(0.336)
-1.714
(0.311)
1.644
(0.359)
-0.630
(0.282)
******
-1.265
(0.416)
1.101
(0.362)
-1.051
(0.421)
0.304
17.304
(0.693)
Colombia
ARMA(5,1)
0.001
(0.015)
-0.303
(0.286)
0.454
(0.187)
0.122
(0.170)
-0.024
(0.159)
0.206
(0.062)
0.742
(0.284)
******
******
0.333
12.447
(0.927)
1/ Standard errors are in parentheses. The models were estimated using
log-differences. All series were allowed to have a breaks in their rates of
change in 1985:1. The Q-statistics tests whether the regression residuals
are white noise. The significance level is the probability that the actual
Q-statistic value will be observed under the null hypothesis that the
residuals are white noise.
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